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STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, POLITICAL
LAWSUITS, AND THEIR COLLECTIVE VOICE IN THE
INTER-INSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE
Mark C. Miller*

INTRODUCTION
State attorneys general (or state “AGs”) are both legal and political actors,
especially because almost all of them are elected officials. State attorneys general
are also increasing their role in federal constitutional interpretation and federal
policymaking more generally, using both law and politics to do so. The merger of
politics and law is a long-standing American tradition. As Alexis de Tocqueville
observed in the early 1800s, almost every legal issue in the U.S. eventually becomes
a political issue, and almost every political one eventually becomes a legal one.1 By
its very nature, constitutional interpretation in our society means making crucial
political and public policy choices in addition to legal ones. Scholars who study both
the U.S. Attorney General2 and the U.S. Solicitor General3 note that these positions
require attention to both law and politics. Scholars who study state attorneys general
have come to the same conclusion.4 For example, in his fairly early study of state

*Mark C. Miller is a Professor of Political Science, former Chair of the Department of Political Science, and
the Director of Clark University’s Interdisciplinary Law & Society Program at Clark University in Worcester,
Massachusetts. B.A. from Ohio Northern University; J.D. from George Washington University; Ph.D. from
The Ohio State University. Miller served as the Judicial Fellow at the Supreme Court of the United States from
1999–2000, and he was a Congressional Fellow in 1995. During 2006–07, Miller was a Visiting Scholar at the
Centennial Center for Public Policy of the American Political Science Association. During the spring of 2008,
Miller was the Thomas Jefferson Distinguished Chair, a Fulbright Scholar to the American Studies Program
and the History Department at Leiden University in the Netherlands. For the academic year 2014–15, Miller
held the Distinguished Fulbright Bicentennial Chair in North American Studies at the University of Helsinki in
Finland. Financial assistance for this project came in part from the Harrington Public Affairs Fund at Clark
University. Special thanks go to Samuel Segal and Matthew O’Hara for all their help with this project.
1.ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 99−102 (Eduardo Nolla ed., James T. Schleifer trans.,
Liberty Fund 2010).
2. See, e.g., CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE
MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY (1992); NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990 (1992).
3. See, e.g., REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW (1992); LINCOLN
CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1987); RICHARD L. PACELLE,
JR., BETWEEN LAW & POLITICS: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE STRUCTURING OF RACE, GENDER, AND
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS LITIGATION (2003); Peter N. Ubertaccio III, The Solicitor General: Learned in the Law
and Politics, in EXPLORING JUDICIAL POLITICS 140–51 (Mark C. Miller ed., 2009).
4. See, e.g., Rorie L. Spill et al., Taking on Tobacco: Policy Entrepreneurship and the Tobacco Litigation,
54 POL. RSCH. Q. 605 (2001); Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys
General, and Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100 (2015); PAUL NOLETTE,
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attorneys general, Peter Heiser notes that “some attorneys general will be more likely
to adjust their legal conclusions to reflect political predilections.”5 Through
participating in multistate litigation and presenting amicus curiae briefs to federal
appellate courts including the U.S. Supreme Court, state attorneys general have
recently begun asserting their collective voice as part of the inter-institutional
conversation regarding federal constitutional interpretation and policy in the United
States.
Although state attorneys general have not received the same degree of scholarly
attention as their federal counterparts, scholars are beginning to understand the
crucial role the state attorneys general collectively play in the inter-institutional
dialogue that helps determine federal policy as well as the meaning of the various
provisions in the federal constitution. State attorneys general are the chief litigators
for their states, thus paving the way for them to use the federal courts to advance their
often partisan agendas. As Paul Nolette has argued:
Beginning in the last decades of the twentieth century, state
litigation has taken on an expanded role in national policymaking.
State attorneys general (AGs), the actors responsible for nearly all state
litigation, have increasingly collaborated across state lines on
investigations and lawsuits against major corporations and the federal
government alike.6
Thus, the state attorneys general are asserting their collective voice in the
institutional conversation over the meaning of the federal constitution and federal
policymaking more generally.
State attorneys general are important statewide actors in the state governmental
systems. As one scholar notes, “[b]esides a governorship, state attorneys general are
arguably the most prominent statewide office one can hold in state politics.”7
Therefore, Nolette concludes that:
State attorneys general (AGs) occupy an unusual position in state
government, with most of them armed with virtually full control
over litigation in the name of their state and considerable
independence from other institutions in state government . . . AGs
have used their position to take on a more prominent role in national
politics, especially through increasing collaborations among
themselves and other actors in national politics.8

FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICA (2015).
5. Peter E. Heiser, Jr., The Opinion Writing Function of Attorneys General, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 9, 17
(1982).
6. NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 1.
7. Nick Robinson, The Decline of the Lawyer-Politician, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 657, 691 (2017).
8. NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 18.
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At this point, it may be useful to provide some background data on the
attorneys general of the various states. According to data from the National
Association of Attorneys General (“NAAG”), forty-three of the state attorneys
general are independent elected officials, while in Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, and Wyoming the attorneys general are appointed by the Governor.9
However, only in Alaska and Wyoming does the attorney general serve at the will of
the governor (giving the governor almost total control over the attorney general
because of this removal power),10 while in the other governor appointment states the
attorney general can only be removed from office for cause (meaning that the attorney
general has a fair amount of independence from the governor).11 In Maine, the
attorney general is appointed by the state legislature; in Tennessee, the attorney
general is appointed by the state supreme court.12
As of July 2021, twenty-six of the state attorneys general were Republicans
and twenty-four were Democrats.13 There were forty men and ten women (six female
Democrats and four female Republicans).14 Twenty-five of the attorneys general had
law degrees from in-state law schools (excluding “top-14” schools) and thirteen had
law degrees from “top-14” law schools.15 States have various citizenship, residency,
legal experience, and age requirements for their attorneys general.16 In sixteen states,
the attorneys general are term-limited.17 In twenty-three states, bar admission is not
required either by state statute nor by the state constitution, but of course by tradition,
all state attorneys general have law degrees and are members of the state bar.18 More
than forty-three states and territories now also have state solicitors general, who
generally head the appellate practices in the offices of the state attorneys general.19
Several studies have found that states do better both at the certiorari stage and on the
merits at the U.S. Supreme Court when they have a solicitor general handle the case.20

9. Attorney General Office Characteristics, NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., https://www.naag.org/newsresources/research-data/attorney-general-office-characteristics/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
10. Note, Appointing State Attorneys General: Evaluating the Unbundled State Executive, 127
HARV. L. REV. 973, 982 (2014).
11. William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from
the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 n.3 (2006).
12. Attorney General Office Characteristics, supra note 9.
13. Who Are America’s Attorneys General?, NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., https://www.naag.org/newsresources/research-data/who-are-americas-attorneys-general/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
14. Id.
15. Id. The number of attorneys general with “top-14” law degrees increased on July 19, 2021 when New
Jersey Attorney General Gurbir Grewal resigned to become the head of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Enforcement Division, and Governor Phil Murphy appointed Andrew Bruck to replace him.
Bruck’s law degree is from Stanford, and he is the first openly gay attorney general in New Jersey. Blake
Nelson & Brent Johnson, Murphy Appoints Interim N.J. Attorney General After Grewal’s Departure, NJ.COM
(Dec. 29, 2021), https://www.nj.com/news/2021/06/murphy-appoints-interim-nj-attorney-general-aftergrewals-departure.html.
16. Attorney General Office Characteristics, supra note 9.
17. Note, supra note 10, at 983.
18. Attorney General Office Characteristics, supra note 9.
19. H.W. Perry Jr., The Elitification of The U.S. Supreme Court and Appellate Lawyering, 72 S.C.L. REV.
245, 269 (2020).
20. See Ryan J. Owens & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, State Solicitors General, Appellate Expertise, and State
Success Before the U.S. Supreme Court, 48 L. & SOC’Y REV. 657 (2014); Greg Goelzhauser & Nicole Vouvalis,
State Coordinating Institutions and Agenda Setting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 41 AM. POL. RSCH. 819 (2012).
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State attorneys general are unique, independent actors in the executive
branch of their respective states because they alone determine when and how they
will litigate in the courts. As several scholars have observed, “[u]nlike most
executive officials, state attorneys general have the discretion to pursue policy
through litigation without needing either gubernatorial or legislative approval.”21
Thus, state attorneys general have the power to litigate on behalf of the public
interest. This common-law power also gives them advantages over private litigants
when issues of standing arise. The fact that attorneys general mix law and politics
should be beyond debate, especially since the vast majority of them are elected
officials. Thus, “[t]he attorney general is both a public official acting in the name of
the state, and a politician.” 22
In general, most state attorneys general have a common set of duties and
responsibilities spelled out in state statutes and constitutions. These functions can
vary from state-to-state and from incumbent-to-incumbent, but in general, they
include:
(1) [R]endering advisory opinions . . . to government officials
[regarding questions of law]; (2) representing the state’s legal interests
[in court], either as a direct party or . . . [by presenting] amicus [curiae
briefs]; (3) drafting and [presenting] legislative proposals; (4)
administering . . . [state funds] in . . . contracting[,] . . . state bonding[,
and other areas]; and (5) disseminating information regarding legal
issues [concerning] the state. 23
State attorneys general also have broad common-law authority to represent (and
define) the public interest and litigate on its behalf. In Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon
Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained these broad common
law powers:
[T]he attorneys general of our states have enjoyed a significant degree
of autonomy. Their duties and powers typically are not exhaustively
defined by either constitution or statute but include all those exercised
at common law. There is and has been no doubt that the legislature
may deprive the attorney general of specific powers; but in the absence
of such authority, he typically may exercise all such authority as the
public interest requires.24
Although most commentators consider the office of the attorney general as part of a
complex state executive branch, some would argue that “[t]he office of attorney
general is a strange hybrid in American governmental structure. With unique

One study found that the solicitors general tended to come from more prestigious law schools than the attorneys
general who hired them. Banks Miller, Describing the State Solicitors General, 93 JUDICATURE 238 (2010).
21. Spill et al., supra note 4, at 606.
22. Id. at 607.
23. See Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as National
Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525, 528 (1994).
24. 526 F.2d 266, 268–69 (5th Cir. 1976) (internal citations omitted).
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functions that combine elements of both the executive and judicial branches, the
office fits uncomfortably into a system that requires a separation of powers.”25
A. The Rise of Multistate Litigation
Beginning in the 1980s, state attorneys general started to join together to sue
federal agencies for statutory noncompliance. These suits corresponded with a
massive increase in budgets for the offices of the state attorneys general during the
1970s and 1980s.26 These multistate lawsuits were designed to protect state interests
against federal encroachment; also, in many cases, they served to force federal policy
enforcement by creating nationwide standards.27 The attorneys general learned that
by joining together they could have a greater effect on national political issues.28
These collective actions meant that state attorneys general no longer saw themselves
as isolated state actors but instead as components of a collective voice in national
policymaking and eventually in federal constitutional interpretation. The National
Association of Attorneys General (“NAAG”) took great pains to increase this sense
of collective institutional interests among their members.29 NAAG was once
primarily an information exchange forum for the state attorneys general, but after
severe criticism about the quality of state lawyers arguing cases at the U.S. Supreme
Court,30 NAAG established various programs meant to improve state litigators’
effectiveness when they appeared before the Court or presented amici curiae briefs
to it or both.31 NAAG also took action to encourage states to sign onto fewer
collective amici briefs instead of submitting their own individually or ones signed by
just a few states.32
A major collaboration among the state attorneys general occurred in the late
1990s and concerned multistate litigation by the state attorneys general against the
tobacco manufacturers. The state lawsuits were filed in large part because the federal
government was not adequately regulating the tobacco industry.33 In general, the
states were suing the tobacco companies to recover the amount of money that the
state governments had paid as a result of state residents’ smoking-related health
problems, thus giving the states standing.34 The Attorney General of Mississippi
filed the first lawsuit in 1994,35 and eventually, all the states (represented by their
state attorneys general) joined in the collective lawsuits or the eventual settlements,
25. Clayton, supra note 23, at 528 (internal citation omitted).
26. See Eric N. Waltenburg & Bill Swinford, The Supreme Court as a Policy Arena: The Strategies and
Tactics of State Attorneys General, 27 POL’Y STUD. J. 242 (1999); ERIC N. WALTENBURG & BILL SWINFORD,
LITIGATING FEDERALISM: THE STATES BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 45–46 (1999).
27. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 23, at 533–34.
28. See id. at 539.
29. See id. at 543.
30. See Perry, supra note 19, at 269.
31. NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 33–34.
32. Margaret H. Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests: Attorneys General as Amici, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1238 (2015); Cornell W. Clayton & Jack McGuire, State Litigation Strategies and
Policymaking in the U.S. Supreme Court, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 23–24 (2001).
33. NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 23–24.
34. MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN TOBACCO POLITICS 75–
76 (3d ed. 2012).
35. Id. at 74.
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or both.36 The tobacco lawsuits, therefore, became a truly bipartisan effort. Lynn
Mather argues that the multistate litigation was “the centerpiece of an overall political
strategy” to bypass the decision-making of legislatures and of bureaucratic
agencies.37 To finance these lawsuits, the state attorneys general chose a novel
approach because “nearly all attorneys general circumvented legislatures by signing
contingency-fee contracts with private tort lawyers.”38 Mather notes how important
this cooperation between state attorneys general and private sector lawyers proved to
be in determining federal regulatory policy regarding tobacco products.39 Going
even farther, one set of scholars has labeled the state attorneys general as “policy
entrepreneurs” in the tobacco litigation who
were able to create “policy
innovations” because of their collective litigation efforts.40
The tobacco litigation ended in 1998 with the so-called “Master Settlement
Agreement” (“MSA”) between the tobacco manufacturers and forty-six states, plus
individual settlement agreements reached earlier with the states of Florida,
Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas.41 At the time, the MSA was “the largest civil
settlement in . . . history.”42 The MSA “marked the first legal success against the
tobacco industry after decades of failed private lawsuits.”43
Among other things, the MSA required the tobacco companies to pay over
$246 billion directly to the states, territories, and the District of Columbia,44 and it
required various nationwide changes in advertising and marketing of tobacco
products.45 It also greatly restricted the lobbying efforts of the tobacco industry.46
Although the federal government proved unable to regulate the tobacco industry, the
MSA actually achieved the same goal through litigation. As Mather notes, the
“[c]reation of new law is indeed precisely what the attorneys general and plaintiff
lawyers were attempting to do, to the extent that they were stretching existing legal
concepts and rules to apply to the factual situation of tobacco.”47 Thus, the multistate
tobacco litigation created a federal, nationwide policy framework for regulating the
tobacco industry, even though none of the institutions of the federal government
proved capable of doing so on their own.
The multistate tobacco litigation is clearly an example of a practice often
referred to as “adversarial legalism.”48 Robert Kagan coined this term, and he defines
this concept as “policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution by

36. Id. at 81.
37. Lynn Mather, Theorizing about Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco Litigation, 23
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 908 (1998).
38. DERTHICK, supra note 34, at 2.
39. E.g., Mather, supra note 37, at 897.
40. See, e.g., Spill et al., supra note 4, at 605.
41. DERTHICK, supra note 34, at 1.
42. Mather, supra note 37, at 898.
43. NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 24.
44. Spill et al., supra note 4, at 607.
45. JOHN SLADE, Marketing Policies, in REGULATING TOBACCO 72, 87–88 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen
D. Sugarman eds., 2001); DERTHICK, supra note 34, at 3.
46. DERTHICK, supra note 34, at 3.
47. Mather, supra note 37, at 920.
48. See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001)
[hereinafter KAGAN I].
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means of lawyer-dominated litigation.”49 Kagan emphasizes that this form of
policymaking is “characterized by frequent resort to highly adversarial legal
contestation.”50 Note the emphasis on the role played by litigants and lawyers and
the de-emphasis on the expertise of judges, legislators, or federal administrators.51
Other countries tend to make these political decisions through legislative,
bureaucratic, administrative, or other expert-driven mechanisms.52 This tradition in
the U.S. adds to American Exceptionalism, or what makes the U.S. government
system unique around the world. In the U.S., however, we rely instead on lawyers
and courts to achieve the same purpose. Nolette notes that:
Scholars have noted the increasing judicialization of American politics,
in which the complex and technical arena of law and courts has become
a crucial battleground for political competition. State litigation is a
prime example of this type of political contestation, becoming
increasingly important in creating national regulatory policy yet
occurring in venues largely shielded from the normal democratic
process.53
The fact that the tobacco litigation ended in a settlement agreement before
trial and not in a verdict from a judge emphasizes the role of the activist private
lawyers and the activist state attorneys general in creating federal tobacco policy. As
Martha Derthick concludes, “[c]rucially, some of tobacco’s most zealous opponents
wanted to achieve what legislatures could not deliver.”54 Only activist government
and private lawyers could successfully use litigation for this purpose and create a
nationwide policy outcome in the process. Along these same lines, as I have written
previously:
the courts provide an alternative forum for interests that did not win in
the legislative branch or in the agency decision-making process.
Because the courts make decisions using legal reasoning and legal
analysis, this new arena for competition forces the government to
justify its decisions in legal terms. Thus, adversarial legalism compels
a dialogue among various institutional decision-makers as well as
among various groups.55
The tobacco litigation clearly started a trend of cooperation among state
attorneys general, although on some issues the cooperation is limited to those from
the same political party. Between 1980 and 2013, Nolette found that there were 686
lawsuits filed by state attorneys general and involving multiple states.56 Most of

49. Id. at 3.
50. ROBERT A. KAGAN, American Courts and the Policy Dialogue: The Role of Adversarial Legalism, in
MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVE 14 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004).
51. See DERTHICK, supra note 34, at 6.
52. KAGAN I, supra note 48, at 3.
53. NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 5.
54. DERTHICK, supra note 34, at 223.
55. MARK C. MILLER, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 289 (2015).
56. NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 21.
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these cases involved the broad policy areas of antitrust enforcement, consumer
protection, health care, and environmental policy.57 Since 2000, multistate litigation
initiated by state attorneys general has become both more common and has involved
many more states than previously.58 As the attorneys general have gotten involved
in more and more multistate lawsuits involving a variety of issues, the impact of these
suits taken together should not be understated.
Given their success in the tobacco litigation, many state attorneys general
banded together more recently to sue drug manufacturers and distributors over the
opioid crisis. A wide bipartisan collection of over forty-eight state attorneys general
sued these drug companies in order to recoup the monies that the states had paid
because of opioid overdoses and addiction problems.59 As Nolette observes, “[t]he
opioid litigation promises to be one of the largest such efforts in the history of modern
attorney general activism, especially as the campaign has spread from focusing on
one industry leader (Purdue Pharma, the manufacturer of OxyContin) to target a far
wider range of opioid industry targets.”60
In July of 2021, the attorneys general reached a potential settlement
agreement with three drug distributors (Cardinal Health, AmerisouceBergen, and
McKesson)—as well as drug manufacturer Johnson & Johnson—that would provide
twenty-six billion dollars to the states to offset their losses due to the opioid crisis.61
Many cities and counties had filed separate lawsuits against various companies, and
the potential settlement might not end many of those over 4,000 suits.62 As one
journalist has written, “[t]he four companies that would be bound by the settlement
. . . are widely seen as having some of the deepest pockets among the corporate opioid
defendants and this agreement was eagerly anticipated as a major pillar in the national
litigation.”63 State and local governments must decide whether or not to agree to the
proposed settlement.64 Some state attorneys general thought the settlement offer was
too small. The Washington Attorney General argued that “[t]he settlement is, to be
blunt, not nearly good enough for Washington.”65 Purdue Pharma, the maker of
OxyContin owned by the billionaire Sackler family, was negotiating its own
settlement deal worth a reported four-and-a-half billion dollars.66 All of these
proposed settlements would have to be approved by a variety of state and local
governmental jurisdictions.67 This is another example of multistate litigation taking
the place of federal regulation of a key industry.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 21–22.
59. See, e.g., Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Nearly every US state is now suing OxyContin maker Purdue Pharma,
CNBC (June 6, 2019, 1:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/04/nearly-every-us-state-is-now-suingoxycontin-maker-purdue-pharma.html.
60. Paul Nolette & Colin Provost, Change and Continuity in the Role of State Attorneys General in the
Obama and Trump Administrations, 48 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 469, 486 (2018).
61. See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Drug Distributors and J.&J. Reach $26 Billion Deal to End Opioid Lawsuits,
N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/21/health/opioids-distributors-settlement.html.
62. Lauren del Valle, Opioid Settlement: Attorneys General Propose Settlement with Drug Distributors,
CNN (July 21, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/21/business/global-opioid-settlement-offer/index.html.
63. Hoffman, supra note 61.
64. del Valle, supra note 62.
65. Hoffman, supra note 61.
66. Id.
67. del Valle, supra note 62.
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B. The Goals of the State Attorneys General
State attorneys general have long interpreted their respective state
constitutions and other sources of state law,68 but the new multistate litigation has
given them a voice in creating federal policy and in interpreting the federal
constitution.69 Nolette argues that multistate lawsuits filed by state attorneys general
have one of three basic goals, which are either: (1) nationwide policy creation, usually
through lawsuits against national industries such as the tobacco companies or
pharmaceutical companies; (2) policy enforcement, usually by suing federal agencies
to require them to expand regulation; or (3) the blocking federal policies promulgated
by federal agencies or by the president through executive orders.70
I would argue that a fourth goal of the multistate litigation is the use of
federal courts to increase the collective voice of the state attorneys general in the
inter-institutional dialogue about constitutional interpretation in the United States.
Collectively, state attorneys general are now the second most active litigants in the
Supreme Court of the United States, falling behind only the federal government.71
State attorneys general have also been quite active in submitting amicus curiae briefs
to the Supreme Court.72 The creation of the National Association of Attorneys
General, with assistance from the U.S. Justice Department, has enabled attorney
general offices to coordinate their amicus curiae efforts and professionalize their
appearances before the U.S. Supreme Court.73 Both of these activities have greatly
increased their collective voice in federal constitutional development and
interpretation.
The importance of state attorneys general in shaping federal policy is
therefore a fairly recent and important phenomenon. Nolette has argued that state
attorneys general “have been and continue to be an important and underappreciated
force in contemporary American political development.
Their litigation
campaigns . . . have gone beyond simply enforcing the law and have instead crucially
shaped the contours of national policy.”74
C. “Governance as Dialogue” Movement
This next Section will explore the interactions of the “Governance as
Dialogue” Movement with both separation of powers and federalism theory. Simply

68. See, e.g., Ian Eppler, Note, The Opinion Power of the State Attorney General and the Attorney General
as a Public Law Actor, 29 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 111 (2019).
69. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 23.
70. NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 19–20.
71. See Lynn Mather, The Politics of Litigation by State Attorneys General: Introduction to the MiniSymposium, 25 LAW & POL’Y 425 (2003); Stephanie A. Lindquist & Pamela C. Corley, National Policy
Preferences and Judicial Review of State Statutes at the United States Supreme Court, 43 PUBLIUS: J.
FEDERALISM 151 (2013).
72. See, e.g., Waltenburg & Swinford, supra note 26, at 242–59; Sean Nicholson-Crotty, State Merit
Amicus Participation and Federalism Outcomes in the U.S. Supreme Court, 37 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 599
(2007); Colin Provost, When to Befriend the Court? Examining State Amici Curiae Participation Before the
U.S. Supreme Court, 11 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 4 (2011); Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action,
and the Development of Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355 (2012).
73. KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY
111 (1993); NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 34.
74. NOLETTE, supra note 4, at vii.
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stated, the Governance as Dialogue Movement argues that the U.S. Supreme Court
does not necessarily have the last word on interpreting the U.S. Constitution. Instead,
the movement argues that constitutional meaning comes out of a continuing interinstitutional conversation or dialogue among the courts, the Congress, the President,
the States, and other political actors.75 In Alexander Bickel’s famous 1962 book,
The Least Dangerous Branch, he was one of the first Americans to advocate for
judicial scholars to consider the interactions between the courts and other political
institutions.76 Bickel said that the courts must engage in a “continuing colloquy”
with the more political branches of the government.77 Bickel was reacting against a
notion of judicial supremacy then common among law professors and other judicial
scholars.
Louis Fisher is probably the next key voice in the Governance as Dialogue
Movement. In 1988, Fisher published his book entitled Constitutional Dialogues
where he
argued that the U.S. Supreme Court was not solely responsible for
interpreting the U.S. Constitution because constitutional interpretation involves a
very complicated ongoing conversation among many political actors.78 Fisher often
refers to this phenomenon as “coordinate construction.” As he uses the term, it
means, “[t]he opportunity for all three branches to interpret and shape the
Constitution.”79 Fisher was also reacting negatively to the notion of judicial
supremacy that was then so prevalent. In later works, Fisher argued, “[i]nstead of a
hierarchical system, with the Court sitting supremely at the top, the process of making
constitutional law and shaping constitutional values is decidedly polyarchic.”80
Reflecting Edwin Corwin’s language,81 Keith Whittington uses the term
“departmentalism” to refer to this governance as a dialogue phenomenon. As
Whittington has noted, “[d]epartmentalism would hold that constitutional
interpretation is not peculiar to the courts, but rather that each of the three coordinate
branches has an equal responsibility and authority to interpret. Whenever each
branch acts, it necessarily exercises an interpretive power.”82 Barry Friedman
generally agrees with this approach, although he adds that the courts “facilitate and
mold the national dialogue concerning the meaning of the Constitution.”83
Both legislators and judges often use the Governance as Dialogue language,
even if they are unaware of that specific academic terminology. For example, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that constitutional interpretation often requires judges
to enter into “a continuing dialogue with other branches of government, the States,
75. MILLER, supra note 55, at 200–01.
76. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
77. Id. at 240.
78. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988); see
also LOUIS FISHER, RECONSIDERING JUDICIAL FINALITY: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT THE LAST WORD
ON THE CONSTITUTION (2019).
79. LOUIS FISHER & DAVID GRAY ADLER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (7th ed. 2007).
80. LOUIS FISHER, Judicial Finality or an Ongoing Colloquy, in
MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW 153
(Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004).
81. EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1938).
82. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 29 (2007).
83. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 581 (1993).
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or the private sector.”84 A Member of Congress told me in an interview for a different
project that “[t]he relationship between Congress and the courts involves a
continuous back and forth between us and the courts. In other words, it is a complex
dialogue among equal branches always jockeying for power.”85 Even Supreme Court
rulings acknowledge that Congress and other political actors have a role in
constitutional interpretation. For example, in City of Boerne v. Flores, even while
striking down a Congressional statute as unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion noted that “[w]hen Congress acts within its sphere of power and
responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed
judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.”86
The Governance as Dialogue Movement includes both scholars of the U.S.
government and those who study the Canadian governmental system. Canadian
scholars often use dialogic language to describe the interactions among their courts
and the legislative branch in Canada.87 While American scholars in the Governance
as Dialogue Movement are reacting against ideas of judicial supremacy, Canadian
scholars in the movement are generally reacting against notions of parliamentary
supremacy.88 On both sides of the border, the key point of the Governance as
Dialogue Movement is clear: constitutional interpretation involves an ongoing
conversation among the various institutions of government and other political actors,
including each country’s Supreme Court.
In the United States, the Governance as Dialogue Movement must be
understood within the context of American federalism and our separation of powers
system. The simplistic traditional understanding of separation of powers theory in
the United States seems to hold that the three federal branches (legislative, executive,
and judicial) all have different roles and distinct functions in our system of
government. The reality, of course, is much more complicated than the conventional
wisdom might allow, especially when the idea of federalism is added to the mix.
Rejecting the three branches of government metaphor, Rubin refers to the U.S.
government as a “network of interconnected institutions.”89 Others have also
addressed the highly complex nature of our separation of powers and federalism
system. Along this line, J. Mitchell Pickerill notes that “lawmaking in our separated
system is continuous, iterative, speculative, sequential, and declarative.”90 Martin
describes the interactions between the legislative branch and the judicial
branch
as “institutional interdependence” because “the Founders created a separation-of-

84. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Communicating and Commenting on the Court’s Work, 83 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2125
(1995).
85. MARK C. MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL 8 (2009).
86. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 357–58 (2015).
87. See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures: (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75
(1997); Kent Roach, Common Law Bills of Rights as Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures, 55 U.
TORONTO L.J. 733 (2005); Sujit Choudhry & Claire E. Hunter, Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme
Court of Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Nape, 48 MCGILL L.J. 525 (2003).
88.
Id.
89. EDWARD L. RUBIN, Independence as a Governance Mechanism, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
90. J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 4 (2004).
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powers system whereby no single institution could enact policy unilaterally.”91 As I
have written previously, “[a]s a matter of constitutional design, the United States
simply does not feature a hierarchy of lawmakers or compartmentalized niches for
each branch of government. Instead, the U.S. Constitution creates a system of
overlapping and diversely representative branches of government, which share and
compete for power.”92 Or put in its most simple terms—and as Richard Neustadt has
stated—in reality, our separation of powers system features “separated institutions
sharing powers.”93
Federal constitutional interpretation is not static in the United States; there
is never one clear-cut answer to constitutional interpretation questions. One must
always remember that constitutional meaning in the U.S. requires us to consider
separation of powers theory and federalism together. As Jonathan Casper has argued,
all public policy making in this country is a “dynamic process” in which “issues
recur,”94 and this is certainly true for constitutional interpretation. Of course, the
courts (and especially the Supreme Court of the United States) do play a key role in
constitutional interpretation in our separation of powers system. As Justice Robert
Jackson has reminded us about the role of the judiciary, “[n]o sound assessment of
our Supreme Court can treat it as an isolated, self-sustaining, or self-sufficient
institution. It is a unit of a complex, interdependent scheme of government from
which it cannot be severed.”95 Or as another study has concluded, “American
political institutions by design are inextricably linked in a continuing dialogue.”96
By using multistate litigation and submitting a very large number of amicus briefs to
the federal courts, the state attorneys general clearly want to increase their role in the
inter-institutional dialogue regarding the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.
Thus, these attorney general initiated lawsuits reflect both adversarial legalism and
the continuing institutional dialogue regarding constitutional meaning in this country.
D. Who Speaks for the States in Multistate Litigation and Amicus Curiae Briefs
Recently, state attorneys general have been taking the lead on questions of
how the state can influence federal constitutional interpretation because as stated
earlier, they usually have the sole power in the state to file lawsuits challenging
federal policy decisions. Thus, the attorneys general are using the federal courts to
help them amplify their voices in the inter-institutional constitutional conversation.
As Marshall explains, “[t]he most far-reaching of the attorney general’s common-law
powers is the authority to control litigation involving state and public interests. It is
generally accepted that the attorney general is authorized to bring actions on the
state’s behalf. As the state’s chief legal officer, the attorney-general has power, both

91. ANDREW D. MARTIN, Statutory Battles and Constitutional Wars: Congress and the Supreme Court, in
INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 23 (James R. Rogers et al., 2006).
92. JEB BARNES & MARK C. MILLER, Governance as Dialogue, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW 202
(Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004).
93. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM FDR TO CARTER
26 (1980).
94. Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 50, 62
(1976).
95. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 2 (1955).
96. Roy B. Flemming et al., Attention to Issues in a System of Separated Powers: The Mycrodynamics of
American Policy Agendas, 61 J. OF POL. 76, 104 (1999).
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under common law and by statute, to make any disposition of the state’s litigation
that he deems for its best interest.”97
The greatest tool in advancing their voice in the inter-institutional
constitutional dialogue has become the multistate lawsuit. In multistate lawsuits,
various state attorneys general join together and file lawsuits against private entities
or even against the federal government. Even though state attorneys general are
generally independent political and legal actors, they can be constrained by state
constitutional or statutory provisions regarding such issues as whether they have a
choice in defending or challenging the constitutionality of state laws.98 Various
scholars have studied state attorney general multistate suits in a variety of substantive
areas of the law, including criminal procedure,99 consumer protection,100
pharmaceutical pricing and marketing,101 health care,102 immigration,103 and
environmental policies.104 While it is usually fairly easy to determine who is
representing what branch of the federal government in the inter-institutional
conversation about constitutional interpretation, it is not always clear who is speaking
for the individual states.105 Because most states have a complex plural executive
system, the governor and the state attorney general may often be competing to be
seen as the voice of the state on various policy issues, even in the courts.106 For
example, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,107 governors
from Iowa, Mississippi, and Nevada joined the litigation against the Affordable Care
Act because their respective attorneys general refused to do so.108 In fact, the
Attorney General of Iowa supported an amicus curiae brief on the other side of the
case.109 How could the state of Iowa be on both sides of the litigation? Wyoming’s
governor also signed onto the litigation, even though the Attorney General of
Wyoming is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the governor.110 In fact, the
Supreme Court seemed a bit confused about who was the true voice of the state in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. As Anthony Johnstone
concluded, “[t]he Court took no note of the distinction between the attorneys general

97. Marshall, supra note 11, at 2456–57.
98. Devins & Prakash, supra note 4.
99. Provost, supra note 72, at 4.
100. Colin Provost, The Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining State Attorney General Participation
in Multi-State Lawsuits, 59 POL. RSCH. Q. 609 (2006); Colin Provost, An Integrated Model of U.S. State
Attorney General Behavior in Multi-State Litigation, 10 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 1 (2010).
101. NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 43–105.
102. Id. at 168–197.
103. Shanna Rose & Greg Goelzhauser, The State of American Federalism 2017–2018: Unilateral
Executive Action, Regulatory Rollback, and State Resistance, 48 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 319 (2018).
104. Nolette & Provost, supra note 60.
105. See, e.g., Anthony Johnstone, A State Is a “They,“ Not an “It“: Intrastate Conflicts in Multistate
Challenges to the Affordable Care Act, 2019 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1471 (2019).
106. Marshall, supra note 11, at 2463. Recall that in forty-eight states, the state attorney general is
independent from the chief executive, because only in Alaska and Wyoming does the attorney general serve at
the will of the governor. Id. In the other states where the governor appoints the attorney general (Hawaii, New
Hampshire, and New Jersey), they can only be removed from office for cause. Id.
107. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
108. Johnstone, supra note 105, at 1485.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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who represented their States and governors who represented only their offices . . . .
In the most significant federalism decision of the new century, the Court mistook
who actually spoke for the States.”111
Multistate litigation and signing onto amicus briefs are ways for state
attorneys general to increase their visibility in speaking for the state, sometimes in
competition with the governor, in the inter-institutional constitutional conversation.
Joseph Blocher argues that by also signing onto amicus briefs submitted to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the state attorneys general are attempting to increase their collective
role in the inter-institutional federal constitutional dialogue by representing the voice
of the citizens in this conversation.112 Blocher looks primarily at amicus briefs from
state attorneys general in the areas of gun control and health care cases. He argues
that the state attorneys general are attempting to represent the voice of the people in
the inter-institutional constitutional conversation. Blocher thus writes, “by
effectively recasting themselves as the people’s attorneys general, the [state attorneys
general] helped solve popular constitutionalism’s problem of institutional design
even as they raised new questions about their own responsibilities as representatives
of the states themselves.”113 The term “popular constitutionalism” comes in part
from Larry Kramer’s book, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review.114 Kramer is generally considered to be a progressive,
which
makes his book different from conservative assertions of popular constitutionalism.
As one review of this book notes, “Kramer articulates popular constitutionalism as
the view that The People have ultimate authority to interpret and enforce the
Constitution.”115 Or as Mark Tushnet explains the concept, “[w]e can find in U.S.
history a persistent strain of popular constitutionalism-that is, as I understand the
point, the deployment of constitutional arguments by the people themselves,
independent of, and sometimes in acknowledged conflict with, constitutional
interpretations offered and enforced by the courts.”116 If the state attorneys general
articulates the voice of the people in the inter-institutional constitutional
conversation, then the attorneys general have greatly increased the importance of
themselves and of the offices they hold.
E. Political Ambition
State attorneys general may be participating in multistate litigation and
signing onto many amicus briefs in part because of their individual political
ambitions. In fact, there is an old joke that “AG” really stands for “Aspiring
Governor.”117 Recall that state attorneys general are generally considered the second

111. Id.
112. Joseph Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism and the State Attorneys General: Responding to Reva B.
Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 108 (2011).
113. Id.
114. LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004).
115. Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1602
(2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)).
116. Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism As Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991 (2006).
117. See, e.g., Devins & Prakash, supra note 4, at 2144; Larry J. Sabato, The AG: Attorney General as
Aspiring Governor. Hint: It’s Twice as Good to be Lieutenant Governor, SABATO’S CRYSTAL BALL: UVA CTR.
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most powerful public official in the state. Political scientists have long been
interested in studying political ambition. In his seminal work, Joseph Schlesinger
broke down political ambition into three categories: progressive ambition (the
politician’s desire to seek higher office); static ambition (the desire to remain in one
office); and discrete ambition (the desire to serve only one term in a single political
position).118 In their study of state legislators, Professors Cherie D. Maestas, Sarah
Fulton, L. Sandy Maisel, and Walter J. Stone discovered that various factors,
including age and sex, affect an individual’s level of progressive ambition.119 Are
all state attorneys general automatically ambitious politicians? As Colin Provost
summarizes the literature in this area, “there is a consensus that a variety of personal,
political and institutional factors shape, facilitate or impede progressive ambition
while serving in lower office, but there is greater disagreement over whether all
politicians begin service in lower office as progressively ambitious individuals.”120
State attorneys general are a key component of the American legal
profession, and American lawyers are often politically ambitious. Since the
founding, lawyers have been over-represented within American politics.121 For
example, of the fifty-two signers of the Declaration of Independence, twenty-five
were lawyers; thirty-one of the fifty-five members of the Continental Congress were
lawyers. Lawyers also dominated the constitutional conventions called to write the
new state constitutions after the American Revolution.122 Of the nation’s first sixteen
presidents, twelve were lawyers.123
Lawyer-legislators have long been the largest occupational group in
Congress and in many state legislatures.124 As of June 2021, 144 members of the
U.S. House (thirty-three percent) and 50 U.S. Senators (fifty percent) had law
degrees.125 Congressional lawyer-legislators are most common coming from the
South, and the least likely to come from the West.126 These figures are part of a long
downward trend in the number of lawyer-legislators in Congress, but nevertheless
indicate that the legal profession is still well over-represented in the legislative
branch.127 Among these lawyer-legislators, it is worth noting that in 2021 there were
FOR POL.

(2010), https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/ljs2010042201/; Colin Provost, When is
AG Short for Aspiring Governor? Ambition and Policy Making Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney
General, 40 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 612 (2010).
118. JOSEPH SCHLESINGER, AMBITION AND POLITICS: POLITICAL CAREERS IN THE UNITED STATES (1966).
119. Cherie D. Maestas et al., When to Risk it? Institutions, Ambitions, and the Decision to Run for the U.S.
House, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 195 (2006).
120. Provost, supra note 117.
121. See, e.g., ESTHER LUCILE BROWN, LAWYERS, LAW SCHOOLS, AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE (1948);
Joseph A. Schlesinger, Lawyers and American Politics: A Clarified View, 1 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 26 (1957);
HEINZ EULAU & JOHN D. SPRAGUE, LAWYERS IN POLITICS: A STUDY IN PROFESSIONAL CONVERGENCE (1964);
Robinson, supra note 7, at 657–58.
122. MARK C. MILLER, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 31 (1995).
123. ADAM BONICA & MAYA SEN, THE JUDICIAL TUG OF WAR: HOW LAWYERS, POLITICIANS, AND
IDEOLOGICAL INCENTIVES SHAPE THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 35 (2021).
124. See generally MILLER, supra note 122.
125. JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46705, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 117TH CONGRESS: A
PROFILE 5 (2021).
126. Robinson, supra note 7, at 684.
127. Bonica and Sen note that over American history, lawyers have comprised an average of sixty-two
percent of the U.S. House and seventy-one percent of the U.S. Senate. BONICA & SEN, supra note 123, at 32.
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six former state attorneys general serving in the U.S. Senate and one in the U.S.
House.128 More than half of U.S. presidents and vice presidents have been
lawyers,129 and a very high percentage of the president’s cabinet have also been
lawyers throughout American history.130 Lawyers have also dominated the office of
governor.131
The dominance of the legal profession among American politicians and in
policymaking led Alexis de Tocqueville in the early 1800s to refer to lawyers as the
American aristocracy. He observed, “If I were asked where I place the American
aristocracy, I should reply without hesitation, that it is not composed of the rich, who
are united together by no common tie, but that it occupies the judicial bench and the
bar.”132 And as Adam Bonica and Maya Sen conclude, “It is difficult to overstate
the influence that lawyers – and by extension the bar – have exercised over the
development of American political institutions and norms.”133
In a previous work, I have detailed the various advantages that lawyers have
in U.S. electoral politics.134 But for our purposes, I want to highlight the fact that
three elected offices are open exclusively to lawyers: elected state judges, elected
local district attorneys, and state attorneys general. These jobs are often seen as
steppingstones to higher political office.135 As Paul Hain and James Piereson
observe, “The advantages enjoyed by lawyers in the American political opportunity
structure can be easily appreciated . . . . They are thus advantaged in their ability to
advance in their careers primarily because they are able to monopolize an important
route of political advancement.”136 State attorneys general are unique in their powers
as lawyer-politicians in part because of their power to control litigation on behalf of
the state and in part because of their relationship with federal agencies. As one set
of scholars concludes:
In recent decades, state AGs have emerged as a uniquely powerful
cadre of lawyers. As the chief legal officers for their respective states,
AGs are responsible for enforcing state law and defending the state
against legal challenges; in many areas, they also share responsibility
with federal agencies for enforcing federal law.137

128. MANNING, supra note 125, at 3. Four current members of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee served
as attorney general for their respective states before running for the Senate (Senators Whitehouse, Blumenthal,
Hawley, and Cornyn); Senator Ted Cruz was appointed as his state’s solicitor general in the attorney general’s
office. About: Members, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/members (last
visited Dec. 29, 2021).
129. See, e.g., AMERICA’S LAWYER PRESIDENTS: FROM LAW OFFICE TO OVAL OFFICE (Norman Gross, ed.,
2004); Robinson, supra note 7.
130. Id., at 669.
131. MILLER, supra note 122, at 31.
132. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 266.
133. See BONICA & SEN, supra note 123, at 33.
134. Miller, supra note 122, at 64–75.
135. See, e.g., Provost, supra note 117; Sabato, supra note 117.
136. Paul L. Hain & James E. Piereson, Lawyers and Politics Revisited: Structural Advantage of LawyerPoliticians, 19 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 41, 42–43 (1975).
137. Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 97
TEX. L. REV. 43, 65 (2018).
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Since the vast majority of state attorneys general are statewide elected
officials, the individuals who occupy those offices must have had a fair amount of
political ambition just to get there in the first place. Thus, it is not really surprising
that many attorneys general have hopes of attaining higher office, or in Joseph
Schlesinger’s terminology “progressive ambition.” Looking at state attorneys
general who served between 1988 and 2003, Colin Provost found that fifty-four
percent either ran for governor or U.S. senator.138 Using data from 1984–2010,
Sabato found that eleven percent of those elected governor in that period were former
attorneys general.139 However, former lieutenant governors had double the success
rate, with twenty-two percent of governors having previously served as lieutenant
governors.140 There were some clear differences among the states. For example,
twenty-nine percent of Arizona governors during that period were former attorneys
general; thirty-three percent of Michigan governors, and seventy-five percent of
Arkansas governors, previously served in the attorney general office.141 However,
twenty-eight states did not have a single former attorney general elected to the
governorship during the period that Sabato studied.142 Wanting to know more about
which specific individual attorneys general had progressive ambition, Provost found
that elected attorneys general had more ambition than appointed ones, those
individuals who actively participated in multistate litigation had more ambition than
those who did not participate, and sex and age had an effect on an individual’s level
of progressive ambition.143 Provost concluded that “not all state AGs necessarily
begin their service with the same level of ambition.”144
Without a doubt, some state attorneys general do have ambitions for higher
political office. As one study noted:
Elected attorneys general seek political advantage. They invariably
curry favor with their political base (party, interest groups, voters) as
they seek reelection or a new office. Correspondingly, elected
attorneys general pay more attention to the needs of their political base
than to the institutional or political interests of other parts of the
executive branch, including the governor.145
Increased resources for the offices of attorney general have also made these offices
more important for those with political ambition. As one group of scholars
concluded, “[A]s the offices of the state attorneys general have professionalized, the
public profile of the office has grown, and it has become a more attractive office for
ambitious politicians.”146 Sensing that state attorneys general were able to increase
their visibility and their importance in national policymaking, more and more
progressively ambitious individuals such as President Bill Clinton and Vice President
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Provost, supra note 117, at 597.
Sabato, supra note 117.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Provost, supra note 117.
Id.
Devins & Prakash, supra note 4, at 2143.
Spill et al., supra note 4, at 607–08.
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Kamala Harris have been attracted to the state attorney general job near the beginning
of their political careers. As Clayton explains: “[c]ertainly the more active
policymaking role assumed by state attorneys general may help to foster political
careers, and in many instances protecting the ‘public interest’ may indeed overlap
with what is good politics.”147
Progressive ambition does require resources and public attention. Nolette
notes that state attorney general offices have greatly expanded both in size and in
resources since the 1970s.148 As Margaret Lemos and Ernest Young quip: “[p]rior
to the 1980s, most state AG offices could be described as ‘[p]lacid and
reactive’”149 Agreeing with this conclusion, Clayton notes that: “[a]ttorneys
general’s offices that were formerly small, intimate environments have grown into
large, hierarchical legal bureaucracies.”150 These increasing resources came along
the willingness of federal political actors to give more credence to the arguments
made by state attorneys general. Congress enacted a variety of federal statutes that
actually empowered state litigation by giving the states the power to enforce a wide
array of federal laws,151 and federal agencies provided funding for these activities as
well as information sharing to streamline the enforcement efforts.152 Federal courts
also relaxed their standing requirements, allowing state attorneys general to
participate in a variety of lawsuits on a wide range of issues.153 As Nolette argues,
more resources for attorney general offices came with “the incorporation of AGs into
the structure of national social policy regime. Congress, federal agencies, and the
courts have all contributed to creating new avenues for AGs to deploy their expanded
resources to influence national policy through collaborative litigation.”154
F. State Suits Against the Federal Government
Multistate litigation is now an important component in the partisan wars
occurring throughout American politics.155 These lawsuits may be either policyforcing or policy-blocking, to use Nolette’s terminology noted earlier.156 The pattern
has become clear that state attorneys general of the opposite party will use lawsuits
against the federal government as a political and partisan weapon. To prove this
point, Texas Republican Governor—and the former Attorney General of Texas—
Greg Abbott was quoted in 2013 describing his job as follows: “I go into the office
in the morning. I sue [Democrat] Barack Obama, and then I go home.”157 The
147. Clayton, supra note 23, at 538.
148. NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 33–35.
149. Lemos & Young, supra note 137, at 67.
150. Clayton, supra note 23, at 537–38.
151. For a list of some of these federal statutes, see NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 39–40.
152. Id. at 36–37.
153. See, e.g., Mark L. Earley, Keynote Address: “Special Solicitude“: The Growing Power of State
Attorneys General, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 562. (2018).
154. NOLETTE, supra note 4, at 33.
155. See, e.g., Lemos & Young, supra note 137, at 97.
156. See, e.g., Philip Green, Keeping Them Honest: How State Attorneys General Use Multistate Litigation
to Exert Meaningful Oversight Over Administrative Agencies in The Trump Era, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 251, 256
(2019).
157. David Siders, Republican AGs take Blowtorch to Biden Agenda, POLITICO (Mar. 21, 2021),
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/21/gop-attorneys-general-biden-477365.
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attorneys general often cooperate with ideologically based interest groups in these
suits.158 These lawsuits against the federal government are part of a broader effort
by state attorneys general to increase their role in federal policymaking and in federal
constitutional interpretation. As several scholars have concluded:
[S]tate AGs’ influence over national policy extends beyond . . . wellknown examples. It also includes significant increases in amicus curiae
filings by state governments, multistate litigation by groups of AGs
working together to combat questionable business practices, as well as
state efforts to enforce federal law in ways that may deviate from the
national Executive’s priorities. State AGs are playing a pivotal role in
some of the most important national political debates of the day, and
they are doing so largely through entrepreneurial litigation.159
The partisan motivated lawsuits by groups of attorneys general are a recent
phenomenon. Republican state attorneys general sued the Obama Administration
seventy-eight times during the eight-year Obama Administration; mostly Democratic
attorneys general sued the George W. Bush Administration seventy-six times during
that president’s eight years in office.160 Some of the most prominent attacks against
the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), also known as
“Obamacare,” were initiated by Republican attorneys general only minutes after
Congress passed the ACA legislation.161 These lawsuits reflect both vertical conflicts
between the federal government and the state and horizontal conflicts among the
partisan state attorneys general.162
Political lawsuits initiated by state attorneys
general therefore cannot be viewed in a vacuum, but we must take into account the
broader context that American law is clearly shaped by entrepreneurial litigation that
develops and enforces public norms. Thus, state attorneys general can be compared
to cause lawyers, class-action lawyers, “private attorneys general,“ and public
interest groups on both the right and the left.163 Politically-motivated lawsuits by
state attorneys general have thus become quite commonplace.
The number of politically-motivated lawsuits filed by state attorneys
general, however, skyrocketed during the Trump Administration. State attorneys
general, almost always Democrats, filed an astounding 138 multistate lawsuits
against the Trump Administration during its mere four years in office.164 Only six of

158. Paul Nolette, State Litigation During the Obama Administration: Diverging Agendas in an Era of
Polarized Politics, 44 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 451, 465 (2014).
159. Lemos & Young, supra note 137, at 97.
160. Erik Ortiz, State Attorneys General Have Sued Trump’s Administration 138 Times – Nearly Double
Those of Obama and Bush, NBC News
(Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politicsnews/state-attorneys-general-have-sued-trump-s-administration-138-times-n1247733.
161. Nolette, supra note 158.
162. Lemos & Young, supra note 137, at 48 (“When most people think of federalism, they imagine ‘vertical’
conflicts between the states and the federal government, conflicts in which states typically are resisting
assertions of federal power so as to maximize their own regulatory autonomy. But our federal system also
addresses ‘horizontal’ conflicts in which powerful states (or groups of states) attempt to impose their will on
others. Vertical conflicts are, for the most part, about who decides—the states or the federal government.
Horizontal conflicts are about what policies will prevail.”). See also Nolette, supra note 158.
163. Lemos & Young, supra note 137, at 44.
164. Ortiz, supra note 160.
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those lawsuits involved a Republican attorney general as part of the multistate
litigation.165 As of mid-November of 2020, the state attorneys general were
successful in their suits against the Trump Administration seventy-nine percent of
the time, with sixty lawsuits then still pending.166 This is about the same success rate
as overall challenges to Trump Administration administrative policies throughout his
term. As Olga Khazan reported in The Atlantic:
As of April [2021], out of the 259 regulations, guidance documents,
and agency memoranda [the Trump Administration] issued that were
challenged in court, 200, or 77 percent, were unsuccessful, according
to from the Institute for Policy Integrity, a think tank at New York
University that researches regulatory policy. A typical administration
loses more like 30 percent of the time, the group says.167
Some states took the lead often in most of these lawsuits against the Trump
Administration. These included the Democratic strongholds of New York,
California, Massachusetts, Washington, and Hawaii. Texas has generally taken the
lead in suing Democratic Presidents. Writing fairly early in the Trump years, one
journalist stated that the New York Attorney General’s office “has arguably become
the most visible and vocal AG’s office to oppose the Trump Administration – a result
no doubt of the office’s sprawling size and its location, but it’s also not one known
to be press-adverse.”168 After President Trump left office, the Attorney General of
New York brought criminal charges against one of the key players in the Trump
Corporation.169 Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services in the
Biden Administration, alone filed over 110 lawsuits against the Trump
Administration when he was Attorney General of California,170 costing the taxpayers
over $41 million.171 Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey was involved in
over 100 of these suits,172 and Washington State Attorney General Bob Ferguson

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Olga Khazan, The Unraveling of the Trump Era, ATLANTIC (July 28, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/07/which-trump-regulations-were-overturnedbiden/619583/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=share.
168. Alan Neuhauser, State Attorneys General Lead the Charge Against President Donald Trump,
U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2017-10-27/stateattorneys-general-lead-the-charge-against-president-donald-trump.
169. Press Release, Letitia James, N.Y. Att‘y Gen., Statement from Attorney General James on Criminal
Indictment of Trump Organization and CFO Weisselberg (July 1, 2021).
170. Siders, supra note 157.
171.Rhonda Lyons, California’s Bill for Fighting Trump in Court? $41 Million so Far, CAL. MATTERS (Jan.
22, 2021),
https://californianewstimes.com/californias-bill-for-fighting-trump-in-court-41-million-so-fartimes-herald/139026/.
172. Emily Jane Fox, “Donald Trump Was Doing Things That Were Illegal And Unconstitutional”:
Massachusetts A.G. Maura Healey On Prosecuting A President, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/12/massachusetts-ag-maura-healey-on-prosecuting-apresident?utm_source=onsite-share&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=onsite-share&utm_brand=vanityfair.

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

3/28/2022 6:03 PM

Journal of Legilsation

21

participated in eighty-two lawsuits against the Trump Administration.173 Hawaii and
Maryland separately took the lead in suing President Trump over his travel bans from
mostly Muslim nations, while Maryland and the District of Columbia joined together
to sue President Trump over alleged violations of the Constitution’s Foreign and
Domestic Emoluments Clauses.
Massachusetts Attorney General Healey argued that the Democratic state
attorneys general were crucial players in the Trump legal drama because, as she
described: “[w]hat a sad commentary that in order to defend the Constitution, to
protect the rule of law, we found ourselves taking Donald Trump and his
administration to court over 100 times, but it was absolutely necessary. The good
news is we won over 80% of those cases.”174 Healey continued, “I don’t think you
can overstate how much energy and effort it took to hold the line against the Trump
Administration that was doing things so entirely unprecedented and in violation of so
many norms and the rule of law.”175 Arguing that the state attorneys general were
representing the public interest in these suits, Healey concluded: “[t]he role of the
AG has never been more important.”176
Given how important state attorneys general have become in suing
presidential administrations of the opposite political party, it is not surprising that
both parties have created partisan organizations to promote and raise money for the
state attorneys general in each respective party. In 1999, Republican state attorneys
general came together to form the Republican Attorneys General Association. Over
the years, it has raised millions of dollars to support the GOP office holders.177 This
organization reported that in the second quarter of 2021, it has raised over $5.3
million—the most for any single quarter in its history.178 The press release went on
to say that:
Republican attorneys general are rigorously defending the Constitution
and have waged an unprecedented legal battle against the Biden
Administration’s radical agenda. This fight against the progressive
agenda being pushed by Democrats in Washington is winning support
from Americans across the country in record numbers . . . . Republican
attorneys general are united in the common defense of federalism, the
Constitution, and the rule of law, and will continue the fight at any
cost.179
The Democratic Attorneys General Association, founded in 2002, has also
raised millions, but generally, far less than its Republican counterpart.180 The
Democratic Attorneys General Association raised about $5.7 million in the first half
173. David Gutman, Bob Ferguson Sued the Trump Administration 82 Times. What’s He Going to Do Now?,
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 14, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/bob-fergusonsued-the-trump-administration-82-times-whats-he-going-to-do-now/.
174. Fox, supra note, at 172.
175. Id.
176. Neuhauser, supra note, at 168.
177. Id.
178. Republican Attorneys General Association, Press Release: RAGA Reaches New Fundraising Milestone
in Second Quarter, July 9, 2021, https://republicanags.com/2021/07/09/raga-reaches-new-fundraisingmilestone-in-second-quarter/.
179. Id.
180. Neuhauser, supra note 168.
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The Democratic press release

It was Democratic AGs that protected the results of a free and fair 2020
election. Now as it is our turn on the ballot in the upcoming midterm,
we thank our existing donors who are contributing again to DAGA and
welcome new donors joining with us and our AGs to guarantee
democracy will remain in the hands of the people’s lawyers, our
Democratic AGs, who uphold the rule of law and fight for justice every
day.182
Note how each side argues that it is representing the voice of the people in the interinstitutional conversation over the meaning of the U.S. Constitution.
The horizontal and partisan fights among the state attorneys general
continue. Following the results of the 2020 presidential election, Republican
attorneys general returned to their habit of filing partisan lawsuits.183 GOP state
attorneys general even joined lawsuits designed to perpetuate the falsehood that
Donald Trump had actually won the 2020 presidential election. Very soon after
President Trump lost the 2020 presidential election, the Republican Attorney General
of Texas filed a lawsuit, claiming that the electoral college votes of four states that
President Biden had won (Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) should
not be counted because of fraudulent voting in those states, instead shifting the
ultimate decision to the GOP controlled state legislatures in each state.184 The
unprecedented Texas lawsuit was supported by seventeen additional Republican state
attorneys general185 and over 100 GOP members of the U.S. House of
Representatives.186 The U.S. Supreme Court quickly threw out the suit, stating that
the Texas Attorney General did not have standing in the case.187 As one journalist
noted, “[t]o Democrats, the involvement of Republican attorneys general in the
election’s aftermath was something more pernicious than typical partisan warfare.
Rather, it was ‘something that we just haven’t seen before.’”188
The partisan struggles in this country continued even after the 2020
elections. Some have argued that since a Democrat is now in the White House,
lawsuits from Republican attorneys general will intensify during the Biden
Administration. As of July 2021, Republican state attorneys general had already sued
the Biden Administration over forty times,189 and many of these suits concern issues
that the media has deemed highly important to national politics. As one political
advisor noted near the beginning of the Biden Administration, “Leaders in
181. DAGA Raises $5.7 Million in Push Against GOP’s Agenda to Restrict Voting, Healthcare, and Racial
Equity, DEMOCRATIC ATT’YS GEN. ASS’N (July 29, 2021), https://dems.ag/daga-raises-5-7-million/.
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Rejects Texas Suit Seeking to Subvert Election, N.Y. Times (Dec.
11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/11/us/politics/supreme-court-election-texas.html.
184. Id.
185. Jeremy W. Peters & Maggie Haberman, 17 Republican Attorneys General Back Trump in Far-Fetched
Election Lawsuit, N.Y. Times (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/us/politics/trump-texassupreme-court-lawsuit.html.
186. Liptak, supra note 183.
187. Id.
188. Siders, supra note 157.
189. Republican Attorney General Association, supra note 178.
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government will use whatever levers of power are available to them to advance their
policy goals. And state Republican attorneys general have the ability to bring
lawsuits. And that’s what they’re doing.”190
State attorneys general have become key players in partisan warfare being
carried out through the judicial branch. As one journalist noted:
With their party out of power in the White House and Congress, the
nation’s 26 Republican attorneys general have emerged as the
weapons division of the GOP, reprising a role played by Democratic
AGs during the Trump era. Just as Democratic AGs served as the
vanguard of the blue-state resistance, Republican AGs are leading
the charge to stymie President Joe Biden’s policy-making
agenda.191
These developments are not unexpected. As a former attorney general of Washington
State, who also is the former president of the National Association of Attorneys
General, has stated:
The base of each party, Democratic and Republican, expects their
attorney general to step up and fight for issues that the base believes in
. . . . There’s a higher expectation now that the AGs are going to be
active, and if you don’t step up, you’re likely to come under fire from
the people in your own party.192
Certainly, partisan groups of state attorneys general have become key
players in efforts to reduce the power and prestige of Presidents Obama, Trump, and
Biden respectively. As Mark L. Earley, the former Attorney General of Virginia,
has noted, “[t]he most powerful elected position it the United States today, with
respect to checking any perceived overreach of presidential or federal power, is not
the Congress, the House of Representatives or the Senate, but is among the fifty state
attorneys general.”193 Earley cites four reasons for this increased power among state
attorneys general: (1) the results of the collective tobacco litigation discussed above;
(2) the increasing partisan activity of the attorneys general, including the founding of
the Republican Attorneys General Association and its corresponding Democratic
Attorneys General Association; (3) the increase of national political campaign
contributions flowing into the coffers of individual attorney general candidates; and
(4) the Supreme Court’s loosening of standing requirements for the state as litigants
beginning in Massachusetts v. EPA.194 Earley concludes:
How does one view the growing power of the attorneys general to
challenge executive and federal power? One can view it as a glorious
playing out of the freewheeling and adaptable democratic system of
checks and balances. Or one might view it as the grotesque free fall of
an orderly administration of government that is now hopelessly

190. Siders, supra note 157.
191. Id.
192 .Id.
193. Earley, supra note 153.
194. Id. at 564–66. See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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divided, reflecting a divided nation no longer able to govern itself in
the traditional means to which we have become accustomed.195
G. Standing Issues
One key component in the explosion of multistate litigation has been the way
the Supreme Court has treated questions of standing for the states. In the traditional
conception of standing, the plaintiff must prove some actual or imminent harm was
caused to them by the defendant.196 If a party does not have standing, the lawsuit
does not go forward.197
State attorneys general have a lot of advantages over their private sector
colleagues when it comes to matters of standing. Some of these advantages come
from the fact that the attorney general can define and then sue on behalf of the public
interest. As Andrew Hessick and William Marshall explain: “States can establish
standing by demonstrating an injury to the same sort of interests held by private
individuals such as the interest in holding property. But because they are sovereigns,
states also have sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests, and the violation of those
interests can also support standing.”198 The advantages in standing held by the states
and available for the attorneys general to use are substantial. As another scholar
explained, state attorneys general are:
[L]ess limited, relative to private attorneys, in their ability to find
an appropriate case to use as a vehicle to advance a policy agenda.
Because their authority is predicated to some extent on the ‘public
interest’ conception of their role that is embedded in the common
law tradition, [state] AGs are able to bring lawsuits with sweeping
regulatory implications that private litigants would be unable to
bring for lack of standing or other legal reasons.199
Thus, multistate litigation brings with it many advantages, including:
Not only do they have myriad ways to establish standing to sue the
President or an executive branch agency, and exclusive doctrines by
which to frame those suits in a favorable manner, but their
participation is also controlled ultimately by the public interest, not
private or corporate interests.200
Thus, standing for state litigants is far easier to achieve than standing for private
litigants.

195. Id. at 567.
196. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER & KATY J. HARRINGER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 81–82 (12th ed. 2019).
197. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA 61–
62 (10th ed. 2019).
198. F. Andrew Hessick & William P. Marshall, State Standing to Constrain the President, 21 CHAP. L. REV.
83, 90 (2018).
199. Timothy Meyer, Federalism and Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, and the
New Federalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 885 (2007).
200. Jonathan David Shaub, Delegation Enforcement by State Attorneys General, 52 U. Rich. L. Rev.
653,
674 (2018).
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Massachusetts v. EPA is the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision that
allowed state attorneys general to gain standing quite easily for their multistate
lawsuits.201 Massachusetts and eleven other states sued the federal Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) in an attempt to force the agency to issue regulations
limiting carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in an attempt to limit climate
change. Much of the Supreme Court’s opinion centered around the issue of state
standing. In the 5-4 decision, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court’s majority, stated
that states have “special solitude” to bring suits that private litigants may lack.202
After noting the Court’s position that it does not allow “citizen suits to
vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the
laws,”203 the majority concluded that the states have “sovereign prerogatives” that
are not available to private litigants.204 Thus, the states can have standing even when
other parties do not. As one scholar has concluded, “[t]he practical effect of the
‘special solicitude’ precedent established in Massachusetts v. EPA is that State AGs
now have near-automatic standing in lawsuits against the federal government.”205
Therefore, state standing is much easier to achieve than standing for federal
legislators, which was severely restricted in Raines v. Byrd.206 It is also far easier for
states to achieve standing than it is for private litigants in many situations.207 For
example, taxpayer standing or citizen standing was eliminated in Massachusetts v.
Mellon,208 allowed in very limited circumstances in Flast v. Cohen,209 and then again
made extremely difficult to obtain in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization
v. Winn.210 States also enjoy various other procedural advantages over private classaction lawsuits. As Lemos and Young explain, “[w]hereas class actions are governed
by a complex set of procedural requirements designed to promote judicial economy
and protect the interests of absent class members, courts have declined to apply those
rules to similar suits by states – even as they have tightened up the requirements for
private suits.”211
Not everyone is pleased with the way the Supreme Court has expanded
standing for the states. Some argue that relaxed state standing rules allow the courts
to interfere in federal policymaking in ways that they should not.212 As Seth Davis
notes: “Article III standing doctrine reflects the idea that courts should not be brought
into political battles about the public interest. They must stay above the fray to the
extent possible, deferring to the political branches and preserving their own
legitimacy by exercising restraint.”213 Others argue that the Supreme Court
did
damage to the traditional notion of standing when it made state standing so readily
available. As part of their critique of the Massachusetts v. EPA decision, Bradford
Mank and Michael Solimine argue, “[i]n the Massachusetts decision, the only
201. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
202. Id. at 520.
203. Id. at 516–17.
204. Id. at 519.
205. Green, supra note 156, at 258.
206. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
207. See, e.g., Shaub, supra note 200, at 676–77.
208. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
209. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
210. 563 U.S. 125 (2011).
211. Lemos & Young, supra note 137, at 72.
212. See, e.g., Seth Davis, The New Public Standing, 71 STAN. L. Rev. 1229 (2019).
213. Id. at 1277.
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plausible theory for why states might possess greater standing rights than private
individuals is because of their quasi-sovereign interests in protecting the health and
welfare of their citizens and the states’ natural resources.”214
H. Lawsuits Against the Federal Government
At this point, it may be useful to discuss some of the outcomes of some other
major policy-blocking lawsuits brought by state attorneys general against the federal
government. A coalition of twenty-six Republican attorneys general filed suit
minutes after Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). The first case in
a trilogy of Supreme Court decisions regarding the constitutionality of the ACA was
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius.215 In a 5-4 decision,
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, upheld most of the ACA, except for
the provisions that mandated increased Medicaid coverage by the states. The Court
ruled that the penalties for failure of individuals to buy health insurance were
constitutional under Congress’s taxing powers, although not constitutional under its
interstate commerce powers.216 Note that twelve state AGs signed an amicus brief
in the case in favor of the Medicaid expansion requirements which the Court struck
down.217 Because of the Medicaid issues, state standing was not an issue in this case.
Next in the case trilogy was King v. Burwell.218 In this case, the plaintiffs challenged
the legality of the state insurance exchange systems.219 Although technically a
statutory interpretation case, the ruling had clear constitutional ramifications. In a 63 decision, Chief Justice Roberts interpreted the language of the ACA in such a way
that the Court ruled the exchanges to be properly constituted. Six states joined the
suit, claiming that the insurance exchanges were illegal. Twenty-two states and the
District of Columbia filed briefs supporting the legality of the state insurance
exchanges.220
The final challenge to the ACA was in California v. Texas.221 The Attorney
General of Texas filed suit, joined by seventeen other states, claiming that, since
Congress had repealed the tax penalties for failure of individuals to buy health
insurance, the entire ACA was now unconstitutional based on the National
Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius ruling. A variety of states, led by
California, entered the case on the other side.222 In a 7-2 decision, Justice Breyer,
writing for the Court’s majority, ruled that the states lacked standing to challenge
these provisions of the ACA and dismissed the lawsuit.223 Justice Breyer concluded
that “[t]he state plaintiffs have failed to show that the challenged minimum essential
coverage provision, without any prospect of penalty, will harm them by leading more
individuals to enroll in these programs.”224 It is unclear whether the Supreme Court

214. Bradford Mank & Michael E. Solimine, State Standing and National Injunctions, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1955, 1958 (2019).
215. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
216. Id.
217. Johnstone, supra note 105, at 1488.
218. 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
219. Id.
220. Johnstone, supra note 105, at 1491.
221. 141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2117.
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was pulling back on unlimited standing for the states or whether the Supreme Court’s
ruling was fact-specific.
In addition to the suits challenging the ACA, states have sued the federal
government on a variety of other issues, including immigration policy. In Trump v.
Hawaii,225 the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld President Trump’s travel
ban from several predominantly Muslim countries as a legitimate exercise of
presidential power as delegated to the President by Congress in federal immigration
statutes.226 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court’s majority, stated that the
President was acting properly under the authority delegated to him in the immigration
laws and that the travel ban did not violate the No Establishment of Religion Clause
in the First Amendment.227 In contrast to the majority, the dissenting justices in this
case felt that President Trump’s own statements showed a religious animus
underlying the travel ban order, thus violating the Establishment Clause.228
In Texas v United States, the Attorney General of Texas challenged the
legitimacy of the Obama era Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”)
program, also known as the Dreamer Program.229 This program protects immigrants
who were brought to the U.S. illegally as children.230 The U.S. District Court judge
in Texas said that the program was illegally implemented, and he barred further
enrollment in the DACA program. However, the judge did allow those already
enrolled to continue and even renew their participation in DACA.231 The judge also
said that Texas and other states clearly had standing in the case.232 President Biden
has stated that the federal government will appeal this decision.233 In another case
filed by the Attorney General of Texas, Texas v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court
denied standing to the Attorney General of Texas in his lawsuit
claiming that
234
President Trump actually won the 2020 presidential election.
In its terse decision,
the Supreme Court stated, “Texas has not demonstrated a judicially cognizable
interest in the manner in which another State conducts its elections.”235
I.

Is Multistate Litigation Beneficial?

Scholars have noted various critiques concerning this new trend in attorney
general initiated multistate lawsuits, including whether the new partisan lawsuits are
furthering polarization in this country and whether it is proper for the state attorneys
general to bypass the normal legislative and bureaucratic decision-making
processes.236 As Lemos and Young articulate: “[l]ongstanding concerns about state
litigation as a form of national policymaking that circumvents ordinary lawmaking
225. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Texas v. United States, No. 1:18-CV-00068, 2021 WL 3022434 (S.D. Tex. July 16, 2021).
230 .Id.
231. Maria Sacchetti & Amy B. Wang, U.S. Judge Blocks New Applicants to Program that Protects
Undocumented ‘Dreamers’ Who Arrived as Children, WASH. POST (July 17, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/daca-court-decision/2021/07/16/6c9a35be-e677-11eb-a41ec8442c213fa8_story.html.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. 141 S. Ct. 1230 (2020).
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Lemos & Young, supra note 137.
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processes have been joined by new concerns that state litigation reflects and
aggravates partisan polarization.”237 Along these same lines, Jonathan Schaub notes
that, “these suits are undeniably driven by politics, both with respect to the policy
aspects and the individual political esteem that a state attorney general can achieve
by bringing the suit.”238 Another line of criticism worries that state attorneys general
are abandoning their traditional role of representing the best interests of their state as
a whole and instead are more focused on the political interests of various groups and
individuals who support their partisan interests.239 However, we should always
remain aware that not all state attorneys general join litigation or sign onto amicus
briefs from others in their political party. As Johnstone notes, “State attorneys
general also can exercise independence from their national parties, as evidenced by
the surprising number of times attorneys general do not sign onto partisan multistate
briefs.”240
Another line of criticism is that states have little incentive to consider the
broader national interest.241 State attorneys general often seek nationwide
injunctions against enforcing federal policies, and these potential injunctions raise
various concerns among some scholars.242 In a broader line of critique, Robert
Kagan, who coined the term “adversarial legalism,” argues that this form of lawyerdriven litigation used to articulate and implement legal norms is “a markedly
inefficient, complex, costly, punitive, and unpredictable method of governance and
dispute resolution.”243 Some worry that the multistate litigation will harm the esteem
in which the public holds the office of attorney general. James Tierney, a former
Maine Attorney General, argues “that the AGs become seen as one more lawyer, one
more politician. on the make, and that undercuts the credibility of the office itself.”244
On the other hand, some scholars note that multistate litigation initiated by
state attorneys general is quite positive in its effects.245 Some argue that presidential
power has expanded to the point that Congress cannot challenge it, leaving it to the
courts to constrain unchecked executive power. States are well-positioned to bring
these issues to the judiciary.246
Others see these multistate lawsuits as
constitutionally necessary in our system of government.247 As one scholar noted:
One way to conceive of some actions by state attorneys general against
the federal government is as a necessary constitutional check on the
modern executive branch . . . . States, however, have unique
institutional characteristics that make them ideally positioned to

237. Id. at 43.
238. Shaub, supra note 200, at 682.
239. Lemos & Young, supra note 137, at 48.
240. Johnstone, supra note 105, at 1502.
241. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 897–
98 (2016).
242. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, State Standing for Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal
Government, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1985 (2019); Mank & Solimine, supra note 214.
243. KAGAN I, supra note 48, at 4.
244. Neuhauser, supra note 168.
245. See, e.g., Hessick & Marshall, supra note 198.
246. Id. at 85–86.
247. See, e.g., Shaub, supra note 200.

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

3/28/2022 6:03 PM

Journal of Legilsation

29

challenge executive action and to challenge it in the most effective
manner.248
Another scholar brings up a variety of points:
Multistate litigation is an important and effective tactic that affects the
implementation of national policy. First, it promotes the sharing of
resources and expertise amongst state offices . . . . Second, multistate
litigation creates a perception of legitimacy that is important in
pursuing successful litigation against the federal government . . . .
Finally, it provides a crucial check on a branch of government which
has been notoriously unfettered in its ability to influence national
policy.249
Mank and Solimine offer another defense of the multistate litigation:
[S]tates are independent (albeit subordinate) sovereigns in our federal
system. When states, individually or collectively, conclude that
Congress or the President or both have unlawfully and adversely
affected state laws, interests, or policy choices in a preemptive manner,
it is an appropriate check for a state to resist that change in federal court.
States, in short, have interests in our federal constitutional order, and
can use appropriate political and judicial tools to protect those
interests.250
Thus, state attorneys general are increasingly using their collective voices to
influence the inter-institutional federal conversation about federal policymaking and
constitutional meaning in our society.

CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the ways that state attorneys general have used their powers
and resources to affect national policy and constitutional interpretation in our society.
The state attorneys general used to be quiet state officials who limited their
involvement to the state courts and state government issues. Now, the mostly-elected
state attorneys general are using multistate lawsuits and signing onto amicus curiae
briefs to augment their role in federal policymaking. These lawsuits have the goals
of creating federal policy when the federal government has not acted, of forcing
federal agencies to regulate under the authority Congress has given them or to block
federal policies promulgated by either federal agencies or presidential executive
orders. The state attorneys general have various advantages over private litigants,
including the relaxed standing rules that the U.S. Supreme Court has provided to the
states. The state AGs also have the common law power to represent and define the
public interest in the courts. Thus, state attorneys general are increasing their
248. Id. at 656.
249. Green, supra note 156, at 255–56.
250. Mank & Solimine, supra note 214, at 1969–70.
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collective voice in the constitutional conversation in this country in large part by
bringing lawsuits to the federal courts against the President.
This new activism from the state attorneys general is a clear example of
adversarial legalism, adding to the notion of American exceptionalism. The activism
is also an example of the way that constitutional interpretation is done in the U.S.
according to the Governance as Dialogue Movement. The Governance as Dialogue
Movement states that the courts do not necessarily have the last word on
constitutional interpretation in our society, but that
constitutional meaning is
achieved by a continuous dialogue or conversation among the courts (including the
U.S. Supreme Court), the President, the Congress, federal agencies, the states, and
the people. By increasingly suing the federal government in federal courts and by
their increasing use of amicus curiae briefs in other cases, the state attorneys general
are amplifying their collective voice in the inter-institutional dialogue regarding
federal policymaking and federal constitutional interpretation in this country. Not
only do the state attorneys general speak for their states, but recall that they also can
represent and define the public interest. Thus, in some ways, the state attorneys
attempt to represent the voices of the people in the inter-institutional constitutional
conversation.
State attorneys general are both legal actors and political actors who are not
afraid to join the fight in our polarized political climate. Politically ambitious state
attorneys general are using the powers and resources of their offices to help them
achieve greater visibility and perhaps higher office. One can assume that their
activism will continue into the future.

